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1Bloomer Girl Revisited or How to Frame an Unmade Picture
Victor P. Goldberg
Abstract
The standard analysis of Parker v. Twentieth Century Fox foll ws the court in focusing on whether
the substitute employment offered Shirley MacLaine was “d ff rent and inferior” from that which she
had initally contracted for.  That, t is paper argues, was the wrong question.  The court managed to
produce the right outcome, but through convoluted reasoning that failed to recognize the essential
feature of the contract.  The contract had a “pay-or-play” provision by which the studio, in effect,
purchased an optin on her time; they would pay her to be ready to make a particular film, but they
made no promise to actually use her in making the film. Cancellation did not entail breach, and,
therefore, it was unnecessary to ask whether she had failed to mitigate.  
The paper traces the case through the courts, showing how the attention paid the pay-or-play feature
declined.  It then analyzes the economics of the pay-or-play clause.  The clause gives the studio an
option, giving it the flexibility to adapt or to abandon a project.  The pay-or-play clause is a nuanced
balancing of the studio's need for flexibility against the artist's reliance.
     Shirley MacLaine Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal.3d 176,  474 P.2d 689, 1
89 Cal.Rptr. 737.  It is the opening case in Stewart Macaulay, et al, Contracts: Law in Action, at
51.   Other casebooks which reprint it as a main case include Steven J. Burton, Principles of
Contract Law, 1995 at 318; Thomas D. Crandall & Douglas J. Whaley, Cases, Problems, and
Materials on Contracts (2d ed. 1993) at 48; John P. Dawson, William Burnett Harvey, Stanley D.
Henderson, Cases and Comment on Contracts (6th ed. 1993) at 44; E. Allan Farnsworth and
William F. Young, Cases and Materials on Contract (5th ed.  1995) at 508; Lon L.  Fuller and
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law (6th ed. 1996) at 266; James F. Hogg and Carter G.
Bishop,  Contracts, 1997 at 496; Amy Kastely, et al, Contracting Law at 1016; Ian R.  MacNeil,
Contracts: Exchange Transactions and Relations (2d ed. 1978) at 132; Arthur Rosett, Contract
Law and its Application (5th ed. 1994) at 375; Robert E.  Scott and Douglas L. Leslie,  Contract
Law and Theory, 1988 at 769;  Robert S. Summers and Robert A. Hillman, Contract and Related
Obligation (3d ed 1997) at 262.  The following casebooks include a brief excerpt from the
decision. Charles L. Knapp & Nathan M. Crystal, Problems in Contract Law: Cases and Materials
(3d ed. 1993) at 949; Robert W. Hamilton, Alan Scott Rau, and Russell J.  Weintraub, Cases and
Materials on Contracts (2d ed. 1992) at 23; Edward J. Murphy, Richard E. Speidel, and Ian
Ayres, Studies in Contract Law (5th ed.  1997) at 508.  John D. Calamari et al., Cases and
Problems on Contracts (2d Ed. 1989) at __ does not cite the case, but it uses a simplified version
of the facts as a problem.  The case does not appear in Friedrich Kessler et al., Contracts: Cases
and Materials (3d ed. 1986).
     The film, co-starring Clint Eastwood, was released by Universal.  Herein, the plot summary:2
“Set in Mexico, a nun called Sara is rescued from three cowboys by Hogan, who is on his way to
do some reconnaissance, for a future mission to capture a French fort. The French are chasing
2
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Nearly all contracts casebooks feature the saga of Shirley MacLaine's suit against Twentieth
Century Fox arising from the cancellation of the proposed film Bl omer Girl.   None really get the1
story right.  To be fair, none try.  The case is a vehicle for exploring the obligation of the victim of
the breach of an employment contract to take alternative employment.  If she refused an offer of
alternative employment that was not “different and inferior,” her failure to mitigate would mean that
the earnings she would have received would be offset against the damages; so, asked the court, was
the alternative proposed by Fox “different and inferior?” And for that purpose it can be great fun. 
Is a western-type movie to be filmed in Australia different and inferior to a musical about Amelia
Bloomer to be filmed in Hollywood?   If so, what would not be?  A musical filmed in England?  A
western musical?   What about a western set in Mexico in which she played a nun with an unsavory
past? Could she have possibly settled for that?
Well, actually, she did.  Universal r le sed Two  Mules for Sister Sara about one year before
the California Supreme Court released Parker v. Twentieth Century Fox with Shirley MacLaine co-
starring in both.  Would the court have also found that project different and inferior as a matter of2
Sara, but not for the reasons she tells Hogan, so he decides to help her in return for information
about the fort defenses. Inevitably the two become good friends but Sara has a secret.” Internet
Movie Data Base, http://us.imdb.com.
     The studio’s option need not entirely lapse when it cancels the project.  It might, depending3
on the contract language, have the right to continued service by the artist.
3
law? More importantly, should it matter?  Suppose that the altrnative film proposed by Fox was also
a musical to be filmed in Hollywood, with the same director associated with the Bloomer Girl project,
and with all contract terms identical.  If she had rejected that alternative would she still have been
allowed to recover under the original contract?  Or suppose that this alternative project had been
proposed by a second studio.  If she rejected their offer would she still be able to recover from Fox?
The hypothesized offer would not be “different and inferior;” regardless of its source, her rejection
should take Fox off the hook.  At least that appears to be the moral.
In fact, even if the second offer had been equivalent, she probably would have prevailed,
perhaps even on a summary judgment motion.  Moreover, she should prevail.  By posing the problem
in terms of the “different or inferior” question, the California Supreme Court deflected attention from
the essence of the contract.  The contract had a “pay-or-play” provision, common in the motion
picture industry.  The studio had, in effect, purchased an option on her time; they would pay her to
be ready to make  particular film, but they made no promise to actually use her in making the film.
When Fox canceled the project, th y did not breach; they merely chose not  to exercise their option.
There was no breach and, therefore, there was no need to mitigate.   And the Supreme Court knew3
it.  Nonetheless, they chose to ignore it (or nearly so).
By framing the case as it did, the Parker court managed to convert an easy case into a harder
one.  That it gave the right answer is a fortuitous result. The contract language was clear, the function
of the contract terms transparent.  Had the court framed the issue properly, focusing on the nature
of the pay-or-play obligation, the case would have been doctrinally less interesting, but of much
greater interest to those concerned with the design of transactions.  Why use a pay-or-play clause?
If the studio does cancel a project that has been made pay-or-play, what determines whether the
studio should encourage the artist to work with another studio during the pay-or-play period?  Would
the earnings from the project with a second studio be offset against the first studio's obligation?
Could the first studio prevent the ar ist from working for the second studio during the pay-or-play
period?
The essay proceeds as follows.  The background of the dispute is presented in Part I.  Part
II tracks the case through the courts showing how the mitigation component of the case waxed while
the pay-or-play component waned.  Part III discusses the whys and wherefores of pay-or-play
clauses, paying particular attention to an issue not explicitly raised by Parker, the relationship
between the artist and other potential employers.
I.  The Rise and Fall of the Bloomer Girl Project
     See Harold Meyerson and Ernie Harburg, Who Put the Rainbow in the Wizard of Oz? Yip4
Harburg, Lyricist. University of Michigan Press, 1993, pp. 183-219.  The show ran for
654 performances on Broadway (at 369).
     Id at 186-7.  Macauley and Whitford, supra note 1, speculate on whether the left of center 5
politics of the play might have influenced Shirley MacLaine’s decision to choose this project. 
Mary Jo Frug proposed a political interpretation of the Parker decision, emphasizing the feminist
politics of Amelia Bloomer; see Mary Jo Frug, “Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a
Casebook, 34 American U.  L.  Rev. 1065, ____(1985).  As we shall see below, the politics of
both Miss MacLaine and Bloomer Girl had nothing to do with the proper disposition of the case.
      Irma La Douce (1963), The Apartment (1960), and Some Came Running (1958).6
4
Bloomer Girl was an adaptation of a stage musical, written by Harold Arlen and Yip Harburg,
that had a two year run on Broadway in the mid-1940's.   The play’s plot and political themes are4
summarized by Harburg’s son:5
Bloomer Girl concerns the political activities of Amelia (renamed Dolly)
Bloomer and the effect they have on the pre-Civil War family of  her brother-in-law,
hoopskirt king Horace Applegate, and his feminist daughter, Evalina.  Evalina is the
youngest and only remaining unmarried Applegate daughter; her older sisters are all
married to company sale men, and as Bloomer Girl begins, Horace is trying to unify
business and family by encouraging his chief Southern salesman, Jefferson Calhoun,
to court Evalina.  On the eve of the Civil War, Bloomer Girl centers around Evalina’s
tutelage of Jeff in matters of gender and raci l equality.  Evalina, Dolly, and the other
feminists of Cicero Falls not only campaign against Applegate’s hoopskirts and sexism
but also stage their own version of U cle Tom’s Cabin a d conceal a runaway
slave—Jeff’s own manservant, Pompey.  It was, said Yip, a show about the “the
indivisibility of human freedom.”
Bloomer Girl interweaves the issues of black and female equality and war and
peace with the vicissitudes of courtship and pre-Civil War politics. . . . [I]t was at no
point an escapist entertainment.  “There were so many new issues coming up with
Roosevelt in those years,” Yip once said, “and we were trying to deal with the
inherent fear of change—to show that whenever a new idea or a new change i
society arises, there’ll always be a majority that will fight you, that will call you a dirty
radical or a red.” 
When she entered into her contract to make Bl o er Girl in August 1965, Shirley MacLaine
was one of the biggest female stars in Hollywood, having received three Academy Award
nominations for Best Actress in a five year span.  The contract negotiation had taken about seven6
months.   Shooting was to begin the following May and was expected to take fourteen weeks.  She
would receive ten per cent of the gross profits of the film to be offset against her guaranteed
     None of the court opinions specifically recognize that the initial contract gave her ten per cent7
of the gross.  The fact is noted in a number of the Briefs available to the courts.  See, for example,
Opening Brief of Appellant in the Court of Appeal, p. 4 and Respondent's Brief in the Court of
Appeal, p. 86. For a description and analysis of contingent compensation in the movie business,
see Victor P. Goldberg, The Net Profit Puzzle, 99 Columbia Law Review 524 (1997).
     Internet Movie Data Base, http://us.imdb.com. 8
     Internet Movie Data Base, http://us.imdb.com.  The d estic rentals were about $34 million. 9
Rentals are the studio’s share of the box office which typically come to about half the domestic
box office; see Goldberg, note 5, above, at 543.
     Respondent's Answer to Petition for Hearing in the Supreme Court of California, p. 6.10
     Respondent's Brief, p. 18.  It is not clear whether she was to receive a percentage of the11
gross receipts, as in Bloomer Girl, or of some other amount.  The large number of stars
associated with Casino Royale (and her counsel's silence) suggests that the contingent
compensation was less favorable for Casino Royale.  
     Respondent Brief, p. 82.  Gambit, co-starring Michael Caine, was a crime-caper movie.12
Internet Movie Data Base, http://us.imdb.com.
5
compensation ($750,000) and expenses of $50,000.  She had the right to approve the screen play7
and the director.  In fact, the director, George Cukor, had already been approved.  His previous film,
My Fair Lady, had been both an artistic and commercial success, both the film and Cukor winning
the Academy Award in 1964.   If the movie had been produced and if it had been as successful at the8
box office as My Fair Lady, MacLaine would have earned over $3 million from the domestic box
office alone.  9
Her contract included a standard "pay-or-play" provision:  "We shall not be obligated t
utilize your services in or in connection with the Photoplay hereunder, our sole obligation, subject
to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, being to pay you the guaranteed compensation herein
provided for."   That is, she would receive the $750,000 guaranteed compensation so long as she10
was ready, willing, and able to perform.  If  Fox decided to replace her or to abandon the project, they
remained obligated to pay her the $750,000.
While waiting for shooting to begin on Bloomer Girl, MacLaine turned down a role in Casino
Royale, for which she would have received guaranteed compensation of $1,000,000 plus an
unspecified percentage.  She did, however, manage to fit one film in; according to her agent she11
"consented to perform in the motion picture called 'Gambit' for Universal Pictures only because she
knew at the time that the motion picture 'Bloomer Girl' would follow."12
     Fox's letter to MacLaine said, in part:13
Because of circumstances which have arisen since the date of the Agreement, we
have determined not to proceed with the production of the photoplay as originally
contemplated.  Therefore, we cannot and will not utilize your services as
contemplated by the Agreement nor otherwise comply with our obligations to you
under that Agreement.
In order to avoid any damage to you, the Corporation hereby offers to employ you
to portray the leading feminine role in a photoplay tentatively entitled “Big
Country, Big Man,” which role you previously expressed interest in performing.
(Respondent’s Brief in the Court of Appeal, p. 7)
     Answer, Supreme Court, p. 18.  The record is silent on the identity of the director and14
whether that director was still associated with the project when it was proposed in 1966.
     cite.15
     Cite.16
     For a listing of the clauses, see Appellant's Opening Brief in Court of Appeals, pp. 29-30.17
     Respondent's Brief, p. 48.18
     Respondent's Brief, p. 77.19
6
In March 1966, Fox decided to terminat the Bloomer Girl project for reasons unspecified.13
They proposed that MacLaine consider taking instead the female lead in a western-type drama set
(and to be filmed) in Australia, Big Country, Big Man.  She had read the screenplay in June 1965 and
had expressed interest in doing the film if there were a diff rent director.   In the March discussions,14
her agent informed Fox that she was no longer interested in the alternative project.  A few weeks
later, Fox sent a letter (characterized by her counsel as artfully drafted) to MacLaine informing her15
that her services would not be utilized in Bloomer Girl and offering her the female lead in Big
Country, Big Man s a substitute, giving her one week to accpt he offer.  The terms of the second16
contract would be the same with a few exceptions.  In fact, of the 34 clauses in the Bloom r Girl
contract, 31 were identical.  The second contract eliminated the clause giving her approval rights17
regarding the dance director (since there would be none) and modified her approval rights of the
director and the screenplay.  
There are hints in the record that the BCBM offer was not entirely sincere.  Her agent stated
in his declaration that Fox had informed him in December 1965 that BCBM was off schedule and if
it were to be done at all, i would probably be in 1967.  In the March discussion of the termination18
of the Bloomer Girl project, Richard Zanuck (Fox’s Executive Vice President in Charge of
Production)  purportedly told her agent that the script was much better now and could be produced
in July or August 1966.  Both her lawyer and the judge pointed to Fox's failure to name th19
     Respondent's Brief, p. __; lower court decision at __.  20
     Opening Brief of Appellant, p. 40.21
     Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 52.22
     cite23
     Actually, she sued for the $50,000 expenses as well, but the parties stipulated that since the24
expenses would not be incurred if the studio exercised its pay-or-play option, she would have no
right to recover them.   (Answer in Supreme Court, p. 20)
     Supreme Court citation.25
     This fact was included in the Declaration of her lawyer and was noted in the dissent in the26
Supreme Court (3 Cal. 3d 176, 188).
     That is, $750,000-$750,000=$0.  Oddly, one of the leading casebooks gets this wrong:27
If the court had ruled that the refusal of the second film constituted a failure to
mitigate, how would Ms. MacLaine have fared on the obstacle to recovery then
presentedSshowing the difference in value in appearing in “Big Country” rather
than “Bloomer Girl”?  (Students often miss the point that had she lost this case,
she is nevertheless entitled to be compensated as if she had accepted the role in
“Big Country.”) John P. Dawson, William Burnett Harvey, Stanley D. Henderson,
Cases and Comment on Contracts (6th ed. 1993) Teacher’s Manual, at 23.
7
proposed irector and leading man as evidence that the offer was somewhat questionable.  Fox’s20
counsel characterized the lower court’s response in strong terms: "[t]he lower court apparently
believed that defendant's offer, and its affirmative defense, were outrageous and in bad faith and
expressed those sentiments in its strangely argumentative language at th conclusion of its Opinion."21
In his declaration, Zanuck claimed the offer was "a bonafide good faith offer and the defendant would
have complied with the terms of that offer, had plaintiff accepted them."  Fox's sincerity would have22
been a fact question and probably would have survived the summary judgment motion.
MacLaine refused the substitute offer and, according to her agent, was unable to find
alternative mployment in the Bloomer Girl shooting period.  She brought suit against Fox to23
recover the $750,000 guarantee, stating two causes of action: money due under a written contract;24
and damages for breach of a written contract.  She rejected a settlement offer of $400,000.  Fox25 26
conceded that it had breached the original agreement and offered as its only defense her failure to
mitigate damages by her refusal to accept the BCBM offer.  Her failure to mitigate, claimed Fox,
meant that MacLaine should receive only nominal damages.  On a v ry thin record consisting of the27
Bloomer Girl contract, Fox’s letter proposing the BCBM contract, short declarations by her agent
and lawyer,  Fox’s in-house counsel, and Richard Zanuck, an affidavit by MacLaine that she did not
     His opinion is reprinted as an Appendix to Respondent’s Brief in the Court of Appeals.28
     Pp. 6-7.29
     P. 18.  Fox relied on the conclusory Declaration of its Resident counsel, Frank Ferguson:30
“Nothing in Article 2 is intended to nor does it relate to any advance waiver by the producer of
the doctrine of mitigation of damage.” Opening Brief in the Court of Appeal, p. 13.
8
work or receive compensation during the fourteen week shooting period, and a few stipulations,
MacLaine asked for and received summary judgment.  That result was upheld on appeal.
II.  The Opinions
A.  Superior Court
The case was first heard by Judge Zack in Superior Court.  He rejected Fox’s mitigation28
defense both because the pay-or-play clause me nt that no mitigation was necessary and, even if it
were, the proposed alternative was “different and inferior.”  Judge Zack provided a straightforward
characterization of the pay-or-play clause:
The contract ... is one in which the Defendant said, in substance, “We
contemplate making a motion picture called ‘Bloomer Girl.’  We desire your services
as ‘Evalina’, the star thereof, to be filmed during a certain period, in Los Angeles,
California.  If the picture is made and if you appear recognizably in the photoplay, as
released, and the contract has not otherwise been validly terminated, we will pay you
the guaranteed compensation, the expenses, and the percentage of the gross.  Also,
if the picture is made, you shall have absolute (subject to contingencies) approval of
the director (Paragraph 29), reasonable approval of the dance director (Paragraph 31),
and absolute approval of the screenplay for the photoplay (Paragraph 32).”
However, Defendant also says: “We do not promise we will ever make the
picture or if we do, you will ever appear in it as released.  The sole binding promise
we make here and now (Paragraph 2) is that we will pay, in exchange for your
commitment to perform at our election as provided in the agreement, the guaranteed
compensation.”
*   *   *
Thus defendant is not liable to Plaintiff, under Paragraph 2, for failure to make the
picture or for failure to have Plaintiff appear in it.  Since Defendant elected not to
proceed prior to the time Plaintiff’s performance was to commence, Defendant’s only
enforceable promise now is to pay the guaranteed compensation.29
The clause, said the court, amounted to a waiver of any right to have damages mitigated.  Fox’s30
admitted breach was not its failure to make the movie—it had never promised that.  The breach was
     Pp. 27-28, emphasis in original.31
     See text below at 33.32
     P. 23 (emphasis in original).33
9
only the failure to pay the guaranteed compensation at the promised time.  Judge Zack had a rather
stinging characterization of Fox’s position:
To destroy all rights under a contract, to assist a wrongdoer, is
unconscionable.  To paraphrase: Defendant is saying: "Yes, we admit we signed a
contract giving you approval of director and subject matter in a picture if we made it.
We also admit that provided you are not in default, the contract requires us, in any
event, to pay the guaranteed compensation.  But there is another unwritten clause in
the deal, resulting from the rule of mitigation of damages which allows us to compel
you to perform on our terms if you are to recover anything in the "Bloomer Girl"
Contract.  Under this unwritten clause we either get your performance on our terms,
or we get off scot-free.  It works like this:  We totally breach the contract and make
an offer to employ at the same salary, but this time on terms we dictate.  If you accept
the offer and sue us on the original contract, we can demur you out because
Paragraph 2 eliminates all covenants other than the one to pay money.  You have
received the money; we are not liable for failure of the other conditions to occur
because we did not promise they would.  On the other hand, if you do not accept the
later offer to perform on terms which only we decide, and then sue us for breach of
the original agreement, we have a complete defense of failure to mitigate damages.
Take your choice."31
If MacLaine did have to mitigate, under the stipulated facts the only mitigation possible would
have been acceptance of Fox’s offer to star in BCBM.  Neither this opinion nor the two appellate
opinions had to confront issues arising from an employment offer from a third party (although it
comes up indirectly in the discussion of “offset”).  Judge Zack ruled that, as a matter of law, the32
alternative employment was different and inferior and, therefore, she did not have to accept it.  While
he noted the differences in the films—a musical to be filmed in Hollywood versus a western to be
filmed in Australia—he put no weight on those factors in determining that the substitute was different
and inferior.  Rather, he emphasized rtistic control, her approval of the director and the screenplay.
“Failure of Defendant to show . . . any facts at all, as to the comparability of the employment, leaves
the Court in a position where there is only one conclusion that can be reasonably drawn from the
absence of screenplay nd director control in the second employment and that is that these powers
were important.”   33
MacLaine did not have to work; but what if she had done so?  Could she keep the income
from the other employment or would Fox’s liability be reduced?  The court emphatically stated that
     P. 19.34
     81 Cal.Rptr. 221.35
     At 222.36
     Id.37
     Opening Brief for Appellant, Court of Appeal, p. 12.38
10
she would be required to offset her earnings: “Plaintiff ... would have to deduct ... all earnings, even
those as a seamstress, during the contracted period of ‘Bloomer Girl’ employment.”34
B.  The Court of Appeal
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Kingsley upheld the grant of summary judgment but on
quite different grounds.  The difference stems from his interpretation of MacLaine’s position:35
  Plaintiff's cause of action, therefore, is not actually for a breach of her employment
contract by an unlawful discharge;  rather it is for a recovery under the contract
according to its terms.  The parties also are in agreement that defendant's alternative
obligation to pay plaintiff $750,000 if it did not utilize her services in "Bloomer Girl"
was subject to an implied condition that she mitigate defendant's obligation by
accepting other suitable employment.  36
He expands on this in a cryptic footnote:
 We have decided the case at bench on the t e ry stated in the text. Since it was tried
below, and was briefed and argued here, on that theory, we assume that the parties
have correctly interpreted their mutual intention as to he particular contract herein
involved.  Our acceptance of the theory of mitigation for the purpose of this opinion,
however, is not a determination that, in some other lawsuit, involving other parties to
another similar contract, the validity of that theory might not be raised.37
His meaning is not entirely clear.  I interpret this to mean that the pay-or-play provision would
normally mean that she need not mitigate, but in this particular case and for purposes of summary
judgment only, she conceded that she would have to accept an offer of comparable employment in
mitigation.  How he came to this interpretation I do not know.  He does not hold that the trial court
erred.  Perhaps her lawyer took the position in oral argument, but the written record does not support
Kingsley’s characterization.  Fox’s counsel, in it  opening brief to the Court of Appeal, criticized the
lower court’s treatment of the pay-or-play clause “as being vitally significant—so much so, that the
Court ruled that its very existence waived the only efense defendant proffered to the Complaint, the
alleged failure of plaintiff to mitigate damages.” “Plaintiff,” argued Fox,  “took the position that as38
     Opening Brief of Appellant in the Court of Appeal, p. 49.39
     P. 9.40
     Respondent’s Brief, Court of Appeal, pp. 37-38 (emphasis in original).41
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a matter of law, employees could sit out their term of employment without mitigating and that if she
were wrong about this, defendant’s affirmative defense ‘would indeed present a triable issue of
fact.’”  That hardly sounds like agreement on an implied condition that she mitigate.  Indeed, in its39
Petition for Rehearing, Fox claimed that the two quoted passages from Judge Kingsley’s opinion were
inaccurate “because plaintiff never so agreed.”40
Plaintiff, in fact, did not back off from her claim that she was entitled to the compensation
regardless of whether she had attempted to mitigate:
It is that right of Respondent’s—to receive the $750,000 anyway, even if not used in
“Bloomer Girl”—which Appellant is seeking to take away from Respondent through
the “mitigation” device.  In other words, an express contractual provision which in
effect eliminated mitigation by providing that Respondent was to be paid even if not
used in “Bloomer Girl” is being threatened by Appellant”s “mitiga ion” theory.  If that
theory were given effect, it would render meaningless Respondent’s express
contractual right to be paid under the “Bloomer Girl” contract, even if her services
were not used.
And, of course, Respondent paid dearly for that contractual right, among other things
because she turned down an offer of $1,000,000 plus royalties from Columbia
Pictures because of the necessity to hold herself in readiness for “Bloomer Girl”
during the period indicated.
*   *   *
Her sole present right of action, because of the election reserved to Appellant in the
last unnumbered paragrph of Paragraph 2 of the “Bloomer Girl” contract is to have
the guaranteed compensation.41
Having determined that there was an implied condition that she mitigate, Judge Kingsley then
had to give it content. There being no law regarding the failure to mitigate the non-breach of a
contract, the court turned to the only analogy available, mitigation of damages in unlawful discharge
cases.  Like Zack, Kingsley  concluded that as a matter of law, the tendered employment was different
and inferior; unlike Zack, he did not rely solely on the artistic control issues:
 It is obvious that the two plays differed widely:  One was a musical with
opportunities for plaintiff to display her talents as a singer and dancer;  the substitute
offered no such opportunity.  One was to be filmed in Los Angeles;  the other in a
foreign country.  As to one, plaintiff had the right of detailed script approval;  as to
     At 225-226.42
     The majority opinion concluded by noting that its finding on the “different and inferior” issue43
made consideration of the pay-or-play provision unnecessary:
In view of the determination that defendant failed to present any facts showing the
existence of a factual issue with respect to its sole defenseSplaintiff's r jection of
its substitute employment offer in mitigation of damagesSwe need not consider
plaintiff's further contention that for various reasons, including the provisions of
the original contract, . . . plaintiff was excused from attempting to mitigate
damages. (At 184)
     3 Cal. 3d 176, 182.44
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the other, she was required to accept a script already fixed.  In one, she was to work
under the direction either of a director named in the contract and, thus, approved by
her in its execution, or by some other director satisfactory to her;  in the substitute,
she would work under a different director n whose selection she had had, and would
have, no voice at all.  Those differences are of a kind that, as a matter of common
knowledge, are all significant to a star performer.  The question is not whether or not
plaintiff would have been wise to have accepted the offered substitute role.  Her duty
to defendant was not to exercise the wisest professional judgment.  It was merely to
accept employment that did not differ substantially from that which the original
contract contemplated.  Plaintiff had been employed in Los Angeles, to appear in a
musical, based on a stage play of established reputation, under the direction of a
director in whom she had confidence, using a script she had approved.  She was
offered employment in a foreign country, to appear in a non-musical, under a director
whom she did not know or trust,  and using a script which (so far as defendant's
affidavits show) she had read only once and as to which she had indicated, at the
most, only a general approval and not a detailed one.  Those differences were
substantial within the meaning of the cases in the field.  The trial court properly ruled
that, as a matter of law, plaintiff  had no duty to defendant to accept its substitute
role.  42
C. The Supreme Court
In the Supreme Court’s decision, the one prominently featured in all the casebooks, the
existence of the pay-or-play clause was acknowledged in a footnote, but it warranted no discussion
from either the majority nor the lone dissenter.  The entire discussion centered on whether the43
second offer was different and inferior as a matter of law.  “The sole issue,” said the court, “i
whether plaintiff’s refusal of defendant’s substitute offer . . . may be used in mitigation.” The44
majority said that it could not.  The nature of the project made it different and the loss of the
     The mere circumstance that 'Bloomer Girl' was to be a musical review calling upon45
plaintiff's talents as a dancer as w ll  an actress, and was to be produced in the
City of Los Angeles, whereas 'Big Country' was a straight dramatic role in a
'Western Type' story taking place in an opal mine in Australia, demonstrates the
difference in kind between the two employments; the female lead as a dramatic
actress in a western style motion picture can by no stretch of imagination be
considered the equivalent of or substantially similar to the lead in a song-and-dance
production.
 Additionally, the substitute 'Big Country' offer proposed to eliminate or impair the
director and screenplay approvals accorded to plaintiff under the original 'Bloomer
Girl' contract, and thus constituted an offer of inferior employment. (At 183-184)
     At 187.46
     So, for example, plaintiff framed the dispute in terms of the mitigation defense:47
... the various admissions by Appellant in its pleadings and declarations and the
various undenied facts and stipulated facts in this case all narrowed the issues to
the mitigation defense.  Even as to that one defense it was further limited to the
question of whether one particular alternate offer of employment by Appellant to
Respondent constituted a mandatory mitigation opportunity for her.” (Answer to
Petition for Hearing in Supreme Court, p. 4).  
Still, plaintiff did argue that the contract did not require mitigation:
Respondent had the right in “Bloomer Girl” to be paid her $750,000.00 even if the
Appellant did not utilize her services in or in connection with the Photoplay.  But
in the “Big Country, Big Man” proposal, Respondent’s right to receive the
$750,000.00 from Appellant under the ‘Bloomer Girl” contract regardless of
whether her services were utilized therein--and even if they were not--was to be
expressly eliminated.” (p.14, emphasis in original)
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screenplay and director approvals made it inferior.  The dissent observes that the majority’s45
conclusion amounts to proof by repetition and g es on to claim that the relative merits of the second
film were not so obvious that they could be determined without more facts.46
 The court’s emphasis on the “different and inferior” question and the scant attention given
the pay-or-play provision was only partially dictated by the parties’ briefs.  The bulk of their
arguments was addressed to aspects of the mitigation defense.  A d when they did raise the pay-or-47
play issue, the presentation was less than crystal clear.  Nonetheless, the arguments were available
to the court which chose simply to ignore them.
     Appellant’s Petition for Hearing in Supreme Court, p. 25.48
     P. 26.49
     6 Cal. App. 2d 136 (1935).50
     At 142.51
     P. 26.52
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Fox presented seven arguments; the first six concerned the mitigation defense.  The seventh
was most strange.  The Court of Appeal, said Fox, erred when it stated that the suit was not for
unlawful discharge, but for recovery under the contract according to its terms.  It further erred when
it said that plaintiff had agreed that it would have to mitigate damages.  Fox claimed that it had
anticipatorily repudiated and breached its contract and that MacLaine had been discharged; both
parties had, Fox noted, stipulated to those facts.  “Moreover, not only did plaintiff never agree that
defendant’s obligation to pay $750,000 was subject to an implied condition that she mitigate
damages, plaintiff vigorously contended quite the opposite.”   “Thus, when the Court of Appeal48
declared (1) this was not a case involving an unlawful discharge and (2) plaintiff had agreed that her
right to receive $750,000 was subject to an implied condition to mitigate damages, it was inaccurate
in the extreme.”  If the court had been correct in labeling this a contract still in force, Fox49
contended, the mitigation defense would fail.  It cited Payne v. Pathe Studios, Inc., which concerned50
a studio’s liability under a pay-or-play clause for failure to make a film (the case will be discussed
below):
Here again we must bear in mind that this is not an action for damages for
breach of the contract of employment, but an action on the contract itself for agreed
compensation.  The doctrine of mitigation of damages has no place in such an
action.51
Fox concluded by noting that the “inconsistency” with Payne “cannot help but lend confusion
and inconsistency in what has been heretofore well settled law.”  This ll seems like a pretty52
powerful argument, but  for the plaintiff.  The law is well settled that in a pay-or-play contract there
is no place for mitigation—the plaintiff simply receives the guarantee.  Fox’s twist is the one
described derisively by Judge Zack.  By announcing a breach, Fox breaches the promise to employ
(which is subject to the mitigation defense), not th  pr mise to pay (which is not).  That argument
seems extraordinar ly silly.  Neither the Court of Appeal nor the Supreme Court overtly recognized
it; but it is the implicit core of their analysis.
D. The Precedents
To be fair, the courts' failure to recognize the nature of the pay-or-play clause was not entirely
their fault.  While plaintiff did argue that the clause did not require her to mitigate, she did not even
     39 Cal. App. 2d 461; 103 P. 2d 447.53
     6 Cal. App. 2d 136; 44 P. 2d 598.54
     "It is understood and agreed that in the event your services are not started on or before55
December 31, 1930, we hereby agree to pay you the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5000)
which represents the four weeks guarantee on this agreement." (At 599)
     Data base.56
     At 142.57
     At 142.58
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attempt to relate the case to the few other reported cases involving such a clause.  In her lengthy
briefs, she mentioned only one and did not bother to note that the case involved a pay-or-play clause.
That case, de la Falaise v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp., Ltd.,  was he only case concerning a53
pay-or-play clause cited by any of the courts.  And, like the plaintiff, their invocation of the case
ignored the pay-or-play nature of he contract.  Fox, however, called three other cases to the court's
attention. 
The four cases taken together provide a good picture of the role of pay-or-p ay clauses.  They
also illustrate how, by forcing their analyses into Procrustean categories, the courts manage to make
simple questions difficult.  I will consider the four cases in chronological order.
1.  Zazu Pitts (Payne v. Pathe Studios, Inc.)  She entered into a contract in May 1930 with54
Pathe Studios to star in "Beyond Victory," to be completed before the end of December of that year.
She was to receive a guarantee of  $5,000, to be paid regardless of whether or not the picture was
made.  Her salary was to be $1250 per week for a minimum of four weeks.  The film was not made55
and she (or rather her assignee) sued for the gua ant ed amount.  The opinion is silent on whether
the filming was expected to take longer, but I think it a reasonable inference that it was not.  Despite
cancellation of the one film, Pitts still managed to ppear in thirteen films that year.   She prevailed,56
with the court finding that this was "not an action for damages for breach of the contract of
employment, but an action on the contract itself for the agreed compensation."  Because of this, said57
the court, there was no occasion to mitigate.  Any earnings between May and the end of December
would not be offset against the $5,000 obligation. The court noted that "she was employed and
received compensation during a large portion of the period in question," b t that did not preclude58
her fully performing the contract.  
 The court observed:  "The question whether this contract was an option in favor of defendant
on the services of [Pitts], . . . to be exercised at will, or was an agreement to engage her services for
at least four weeks with a guarantee of $5,000 as a minimum co pensation, became a question of
     At 140.59
     39 Cal. App. 2d 461; 103 P. 2d 447.  Henri Falaise, Marquis de la Coudraye was the third of60
her five husbands.  According to her mini-biography, “she feuded with the press and enjoyed
lawsuits.”  (Rod Crawford <puffinus@u.washington.edu> at Internet Movie Data Base,
http://us.imdb.com.
     So, if the American gross receipts were less than $300,000, she would receive $35,000. For61
every dollar of gross receipts above $300,000, she would receive an additional ten percent.
     At 469.62
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fact for the trial court to determine."  If the latter, the court would have had to deal with the59
question of whether the $5,000 was liquidated damages or a penalty.  It is a distinction without a
difference.  The court managed to convince itself of the former so it did not have to deal with the
doctrinal niceties of liquidated damages.  Of more interest than the doctrinal smokescreen is the
court's characterization of the clause as an option.  Pathe paid Pitts $5,000 to be ready to make a
particular film in a seven month period, but Pathe retained the right to cancel the film or to make the
film with someone else.
2. Constance Bennett. (de la Falaise v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp., Ltd.)  Constance60
Bennett agreed to make two films in London in 1936, each to be made in eight weeks or less. The
first was completed, but the second never made.  Her compensation for each picture was ten percent
of the American gross receipts to be offset against a guarantee of $30,000.  In addition, she would
receive a guaranteed $5,000 which was not to be recouped from her share of the gross receipts.61
The start date for the second picture was to be between September 1 and November 14 and the
studio promised to give notice of the starting date by August 1.  The studio sought to cancel the
contract in the spring of 1936, but she refused; the studio failed to give notice of a start date on
August 1, whereupon she sued the studio for the $35,000 minimum guarantee.
In its defense, the studio noted that she had begun working on a picture for Twentieth
Century Fox in July ("Ladies in Love") and that this would relieve them of their duty to notify on
August 1.  However, the court found, she would have been able to complete that film in time to
appear in England by September 1, so her behavior did not excuse the studio.  The only issue was
whether any employment she had taken between September 1 and January 1 should be offset against
the $35,000 guarantee.  She received no movie offers during th  period, but did perform in two radio
programs, receiving $4,000 for the two.  
The court distinguished this case from Payne "which instead of being an action for breach of
contract, was based upon the failure of respondent to pay the minimum compensation specified in an
agreement very similar to the one here involved."  Because Payne was not an action for breach of62
contract, the doctrine of mitigation did not apply.  Since this was an action for breach of contract, the
     At 469.63
     155 F. 2d 84.64
     "The Producer expressly waives and releases the corporation from all claims or causes of65
action based on the failure of the Corporation actually to utilize the services of the Producer or
the results thereof, or on the failure of the Corporation to produce or to release or to continue the
distribution of the Pictures; provided, however, that nothing contained in this Article of this
agreement shall be deemed to relieve the Corporation of its obligation to pay the Producer the
fixed compensation payable to him pursuant to Article 1 of Section 11 of this Agreement.” (At
86)
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doctrine would apply.  This is a most peculiar syllogism, given that the action is for precisely the same
thing—payment of the guarantee after the studio chose not to go forward.
The court cited the "well settled" rule that the damages for wrongful discharge were the salary
less the amount the employee might have earned with reasonable effort from other employment; the
employee need not enter into service that was different or inferior o mitigate damages.  The rule, the
same one at issue in Parker,  was even less relevant here.  She had not turned down any alternative
employment; she had accepted employment on radio.  The court conflated two distinct questions:
should the defendant’s damages be reduced by  the revenues the plaintiff should have earned (but
didn’t) in mitigation; should the plaintiff’s actual earnings be offset against the damages.  Having so
boxed itself in, the court extricated itself with a nonsensical argument.  The radio engagement, said
the court, "might be denominated different in character from that required of a moving picture
actress, [but] it cannot be said to be inferior thereto."  Th  radio earnings would, therefore, be offset63
against the damages so that she recovered only $31,000.
3.  Pare Lorentz. (Lorentz v. R. K.O. Pictures, Inc.)   Lorentz agreed to write, direct, and64
produce a movie for $50,000 plus ten per cent of the net profits.  The picture was over budget and
behind schedule and the studio finally stopped production.  Lorentz had already received the $50,000;
he sued for a number of items, including the percentage compensation he would have earned and the
lost screen credits.   The relevant contract clause was written in the form of  a waiver.  In gr nting65
the studio summary judgment on these claims, the court explained why it made sense for the studio
to maintain the option of replacing the director or terminating the project:
 the contract makes employment certain and as well the payment of the fixed
compensation.  Such obligation is fixed, but the work to be done and the results of the
work must remain in the sound discretion of the moving picture corporation.  The
expensive business enterprise may by the turn of events at any time indicate the
wisdom of discontinuing the production or the showing of a photoplay.  Should
events of such portent occur, the corporation is absolved from liability from
     At 86.66
     195 F. 2d 167.67
     At 168-169.68
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prospective benefits to appellant.  Appellee has reserved decision on such question to
its own discretion.66
4.  Ann Sheridan. (RKO Pictures, Inc. v Sheridan)   In April 1949 Sheridan accepted the67
leading female role in a motion picture entitled Carriage Entrance.  Her fee was $50,000 plus an
additional $100,000 which was to be paid out of the gross receipts of the picture.  The contract gave
her approval of the script, the director, and the leading man.  At the time she signed the contract she
also signed a letter stating that she approved the script,  director, and Robert Young as the leading
male actor.  Young subsequently rejected the role and the parties could not agree on an adequate
replacement.  In August, RKO sent her a letter saying that it would not use her in the picture and
would not pay her any compensation.
The dispute involved two mechanical issues with respect to the pay-or-play clause.  What
event would trigger the clause and, if it were triggered, what compensation should be paid?  Neither
the purpose of a pay-or-play clause nor the mitigation defense were at stake.  The clause, which
included an awkwardly worded proviso, read as follows:
 Producer shall not be required to use Artist's services hereunder or to complete the
production of 'Carriage Entrance,' and shall be deemed to have fully performed all its
obligations to Artist by paying Artist the minimum compensation payable to Artist
hereunder.  However, if, because Artist does not approve any one or more of the
items specified in paragrph 1 [the director, script, and leading man], Artist does not
become obligated to, and does not, render any services pursuant hereto, Producer
shall not be required to pay any compensation whatever to Artist hereunder.68
RKO argued that the last sentence meant that the pay-or-play obligation would not be
triggered if she failed  to act in good faith by not approving the alternative leading men they ha
proposed or if she did not render any services under the contract.  The court held that the contract
said "and" and meant "and."  Even if she had unreasonably withheld approval of alternative leading
men, as long as she ad rendered some services the clause would be in effect.  Since the jury had
found that her consultations regarding costumes and her fittings of gowns were services rendered
pursuant to the contract, the clause was triggered.
Sheridan argued that the trial judge erred by ruling as a matter of law that the phrase
"minimum compensation" meant $50,000. The phrase, she argued (and the court agreed), was
definitely ambiguous and parol evidence should have been admitted; the case was remanded on this
point.
     Offsetting Constance Bennett’s radio earnings was probably wrong, but defensible as a69
default rule; the Sheridan court’s acceptance of parol evidence was almost certainly a stretch.
     Garfein v. Garfein, 16 Cal. App. 3d 155; 93 Cal. Rptr. 714.  70
     The amount was for payments falling due after the date of separation.71
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I find the first conclusion more compelling than the second.  At worst, the second issue
involves a one-shot drafting snafu which could easily be rectified by making clear that the minimum
compensation and the guaranteed payment are one and the same.  The first issue was highlighted by
awkward drafting, but the problem can be deeper.  The studio’s pay-or-play obligation has to be
triggered by a specific event; only in some circumstances will that event be the signing of the contract.
In the other four contracts considered in this Section (Parker, Payne, de la Falaise, and Lorentz),
the pay-or-play obligation began the instant the contract had been entered into.  But, as Sheridan
illustrates, that need not be the case.
5.   In sum.  This tour of the precedents suggests that while the raw materials for a sensible
analysis of Parker were there, they would be easy to miss.  The outcomes were not so bad, and69
there was some awareness of the function of the pay-or-play clause.  But the attempt to pigeonhole
the facts into traditional legal categories did more to obscure than to enlighten.  The opacity of the
precedents is starkly illustrated by the failure of the Parker litigants (and courts) to appreciate their
implications. Three were raised by Fox’s counsel, not MacLaine’s, despite the fact that they should
support her claim.  Fox failed to recognize that by calling these cases to the court’s attention, it was
really undermining its own case.  And the plaintiff returned the favor.  Only one of the cases, de la
Falaise, was cited by the plaintiff and the courts, and that only for the proposition that mitigation
does not require the plaintiff to take employment that was different and inferior.
III. Pay-or-Play
The essential features of a pay-or-play clause were spelld out in a decision contemporaneous
with Parker by none other than Judge Kingsley.   The issue arose in the context of a divorce.70
Carroll Baker had a seven picture deal with Paramount in which she had agreed to perform in at least
one picture a year.  Paramount agreed to pay her a fixed fee each year whether or not she worked,
the fee being $200,000 per year in the early years and $300,000 in the later years.  After she starred
in Harlow, a 1965 release, Paramount did not call on her to make any more pictures.  Paramount
attempted to renege, prompting her to sue, and the court, in an unpublished opinion, found in her
favor.  In the divorce proceedings, the issue facing the Court of Appeal was whether the final $1.2
million of payments under the pay-or-play clause should be treated as property, as the husband
contended, or future earnings.  The court found the latter.  Judge Kingsley spelled out clearly the71
meaning of the pay-or-play clause:
[The contract] required the wife to hold herself available for servic  in one  picture
each 12-month period; without the consent of Paramount she could not accept other
     At 158-159.72
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potentially conflicting engagements, business or social. [Footn te: Under the contract,
plaintiff could perform for another producer, provided she gave Paramount notice of
her intent; in that event, Paramount was required either to consent or to schedule her
for its own picture at the time or times involved.]
*   *   *   
   The husband argues that the several payments were not "earnings" because the wife
was entitled to them even though she did not "work”S i.e., appear in any motion
pictures.  But appearance in a picture was only one alternative of her obligations to
her employer under the contract.  Under a "play or pay" contract, the employer
secures: (1) an option on the performer's services; and (2) the assurance that a
performer will not, without its consent, create competition for other pictures of the
employer by performing for some other producer.  "They also serve who only sit and
wait." We hold that the wife "earns" her agreed compensation by refraining from
performing for anyone except the employer during the period of the contract, unless
with the employer's consent. [Foo note: The effect of the contract, obviously, was to
limit plaintiff in bargaining with other producers and subjected her to losing th
opportunity to appear in pictures for other producers, which she might regard as
important to her career or her bank account . . . .]  Since the payments made after
June 1967, were "earned" after that date, they were separate property. [Footnote:
The duty to pay, where no picture was made, did not accrue until the final day of each
12-month period, since the wife was required to hold herself available for the full
period.  The compensation, thus, was not "earned" until that last day.]72
Judge Kingsley turns Parker on its head.  A pay-or-play clause does not require the talent to
seek reasonable employment alternatives to mitigate damages.  Rather, he suggests, it giv s the studio
the power toprevent the talent from working with a rival studio for a period of time.  It is not clear
whether this drastically revised vision reflects rapid learning on the part of Judge Kingsley; perhaps
he already knew it and this knowledge was the basis for his cryptic footnote in Parker.  What is clear
is that for the last quarter century this alternative understanding of the pay-or-play clause has been
on the books and was put there by the intermediate court judge who helped create Parker.
Carroll Baker’s Paramount contract differed from the five discussed in the previous section.
Those were all for specific films to be made in a reasonably well-defined time slot.  The Baker
contract was for seven unidentified (and unidentifiable at the time of contract) films to be made over
a seven year period.  This, along with the Sheridan contract's variation on the triggering mechanism,
underscores the point that not all pay-or-play clauses are created equal.  
The two basic features, however, remain those identified by Judge Kingsley: the studio has
paid for the option of using the talent for some time period and the talent has agreed not to work for
someone lse during that period unless it r ceives the studio's permission or pays for the privilege.
Indeed, these features are memorialized in the union contracts.  The Director’s Guild agreement, for
     1990 DGA Basic Agreement §6-105; cited in 2 Thomas D. Selz et al., Entertainment Law73
§27.10.
     See Goldberg, note ? supra at 538.74
     For descriptions of the evolution of various film projects, see Julie Salamon, The Devil’s75
Candy, 1991 (The Bonfire of the Vanities);  Steven Bach Final Cut: Dreams and Disaster in the
Making of Heaven’s Gate (1985); Spike Lee, By Any Means Necessary: The Trials and
Tribulations of the Making of Malcolm X (1992); Sidney Pink, So You Want to Make Movies
(1989) (independent films, most filmed in Europe); and Thomas Schatz, The Genius of the System
(1988) (major studio films from 1930-1950).
     Cite business text on value of option.76
     In the 1930's the major studios turned out nearly 400 films a year; in the 1960's the number77
had fallen to less than 200.  Mark Weinstein, Profit Sharing Contracts in Hollywood: Evolution
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example, says that if the director is employed by a third party, the employer “shall be entitled to an
offset of the compensation arising from such new employment for such remaining portion of the
guaranteed period against the compensation remaining unpaid. . . . [However,] the Director shall have
no obligation to mitigate damages arising from his or her removal. . . .”73
A.  The Studio’s Option
Movie-making is a sequential process.  A studio might begin with a concept, hire a
screenwriter to draft a screenplay, hire the director and actors and other talent, and, if all goes
smoothly, a finished feature film will be the result.  But things do not always run smoothly.  Most
projects do not make it to the screen.  Indeed, most die early before the studio has invested a
significant amount.  Even if a project does not die, its course can change const tly as circumstances74
or information change.  The screenplay can be revised, another studio might be coming to market
with a movie about a similar subject, a particular str might become available, the co-stars might lack
chemistry, and so forth.  By maintaining the flexibility to react, the studio can adapt the project to75
changed circumstances.  As the primary claimant on the film’s earnings, the studio has the incentive
to make adaptive decisions which enhance the  expected value of the project. 76
However, other participants must make decisions which depend on the likelihood that the
project will go forward and they do not want their interests to be totally ignored.  Prior to 1950, when
much of the talent was under long-term contract to the studios and studios produced a large number
of films, the studios internalized  these concerns.  If Ms. X was dropped from a particular film, the
studio still had to pay her salary.  The studio held a portfolio of talent.  If someone were dropped
from one film, or a project canceled, the studio had a large number of other projects in the works so
that the studio’s cost of carrying an inventory of contract players was not great.  As the number of
films produced declined, the long-term contracts disappeared.  Tal nt was hired largely on a film-77
and Analysis, J. of Legal Studies (forthcoming).
     The standard contract was described in De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 6778
Cal.App.2d 225,  153 P.2d 983) (1944).
 The contract gave the Producer, defendant, the right to suspend plaintiff for any
period or periods when she should fail, refuse or neglect to perform her services to
the full limit of her ability and as instructed by the Producer and for any additional
period or periods required to complete the portrayal of a role refused by plaintiff
and assigned to another artist. Plaintiff was to receive no compensation while so
suspended or thereafter until she offered to resume her work. It was provided that
the Producer had the right to extend the term of the contract at its option, for a
time equal to the periods of suspension. (At 228)
Olivia DeHavilland (the court is quite free with the spelling of her name) had been suspended for
twenty-five weeks over the course of her seven year contract.  The court continued: 
The several periods of suspension totaled some twenty-five weeks. The facts as to
the suspensions are not in dispute; defendant's right to impose them is not
questioned. Plaintiff's reason for refusing the several roles was that they were
unsuited to her matured ability and that she could not faithfully and conscientiously
portray them. Her good faith and motives are not in issue, but according to the
contract the Producer was the sole judge in such matters and she had to do as she
was told. (At 229)
     In De Haviland the court voided contract extensions beyond seven years.79
     Example of some cases.  80
     See, for example, Alcoa v.  Essex Group, Inc.499 F.  Supp.  53 (W.D. Pa.  1980).81
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by-film basis and the studio had to pay for the talent’s readiness on that basis as well.  (The per
picture contracts of Constance Bennett and Zazu Pitts were exceptions in their era, as was Carroll
Baker’s in the present era.)  In the studio contracts of the 1930's and <40's, the studio determined
which roles the actor would play.  If the actor refused, the studio could suspend the actor.  The78
actor would not be compensated while on suspension and the clock would stop running.  That is, the
suspension time would be tacked on to the end of the contract. In modern multi-picture79
agreements, the actor has some discretion as to acceptance of a particular role. 
The opportunity cost of accepting a contract for a particular film project is the offers tha
might come along in the intervening months.  In Shirley MacLaine’s case, at least one offer, Casino
Royale, was foreclosed by her acceptance of the Bloomer Girl contract.  If the studio were free to
adjust without taking this opportunity cost (or reliance) into account, the talent would be reluctant
to commit to the project in the first place.  The pay-or-play clause provides some protection of the
artist's reliance.  It is analogous to the “take-or-pay” or “demand charge” often used in long-term80 81
     The contracts between oil refineries selling petroleum coke and their aluminum company82
purchasers used a variety of devices (including “standby” charges and nonlinear pricing) to
protect the seller’s reliance while granting the buyer some discretion over the quantity.  See
Victor P. Goldberg and John R. Erickson, “Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term
Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke,” 30 J. of Law & Economics 369, 378-382.
     The studio should be free to make that decision without second-guessing by the courts.  In a83
recent case, however, the court held that the studio's discretion was limited by an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The facts are somewhat unusual as the disputed contract
was apparently part of a settlement following the dissolution of the personal and romantic
relationship of Clint Eastwood and Sondra Locke.  Immediately following the settlement, Warner
(Eastwood's studio) signed a development deal with Locke which included a $750,000 pay-or-
play arrangement to direct some future unspecified project.  Warner did not approve any of her
projects, paid her the $750,000 (plus another $750,000 for an exclusive first look) and argued
that it had satisfied its contractual duty.  Locke argued that the studio, to please Eastwood, had
no intention of making any movie with her and that the deal was a sham.  She sued for breach of
contract and for fraud; the California Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court, denied Warner
summary judgment. Locke v. Warner Bros, Inc. 1997 Cal. App. LEXIS 676.  In contrast to
Parker's implication that only the $750,000 guarantee was at stake, the court noted that "[m]erely
because Warner paid Locke the guaranteed compensation under the agreement does not establish
Warner fulfilled its contractual obligation. As pointed out by Locke, the value in the subject
development deal was not merely the guaranteed payments under the agreement, but also the
opportunity to direct and produce films and earn additional sums, and most importantly, the
opportunity to promote and enhance a career." (At 12)    
     Cite.84
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supply contracts.  The seller (the artist) is promised some compensation even if the buyer (the82
studio) chooses to take nothing at all.  Shirley MacLaine is to receive the $750,000 even if the movie
is not made.  By reducing the incremental costs of continuation, these devices provide some
protection to the seller’s (artist’s) reliance, balancing that reliance interest against the buyer’s
(studio’s) need for flexibility.  The parties leave the decision to proceed entirely in the hands of the
studio with pay-or-play merely altering the prices it faces.83
The assurance is not given lightly.  Recall that Shirley MacLaine’s contract negotiations took
seven months and were not concluded until the parties had agreed on the director.  The record is
silent on whether Cukor had also signed his contract at the same time, but that is a common
practice.  The studio will try to delay triggering its pay-or-play obligations until the project is far84
along.  Until the contract is formed, the studio has no obligation to pay anything.  MacLaine might
turn down roles which would conflict with this project because she anticipates that the project will
go forward, but until the pay-or-play clause is triggered, she bears all the consequences.  The parties
     The contract formula will typically serve as the baseline for renegotiation.  When, for85
example, Alan Arkin’s contract was terminated two weeks before principle photography was to
begin on Bonfire of the Vanities, the studio’s only legal obligation was to pay his fixed
compensation—$120,000.  However, the co-producer suggested that the studio would do more. 
“We expressed our apologies to Alan—and we’ll have to negotiate something.  This is not the
first time this sort of thing has happened—nor will it be the last, but we are concerned about his
feelings.”  (Salamon, note 73 at 110).
     "In the event that Artist receives a conflicting bona fide <pay-or-play’ offer on another motion86
picture which Artist would otherwise accept, Artist shall accord Producer the right to pre-empt
such other offer by furnishing Artist with a “pay-or-play” guarantee for his guaranteed
compensation hereunder within five (5) business days of receipt by Producer of a written request
therefor describing the conflicting <pay-or-play’ offer.  If producer so exercises said right of
preemption, Artist shall render his services hereunder on the Start Date, as defined herein.  If
Producer does not so furnish Artist with such guarantee, Artist may elect to be released from his
obligations hereunder.”  (Redacted contract excerpt available from the author.)  The star of the
same movie had a more attractive pay-or-play clause, though, unlike Shirley MacLaine’s contract,
it was not triggered upon signing.
     See Goldberg, supra note ?, at  538-539.87
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bargain, in effect, over when, and how, the actor’s reliance (forbearance) will be protected.  Th85
subtlety of the triggering mechanism is well illustrated by the contract of a supporting actor who
would only be made pay-or-play upon receipt of a bona fide conflicting offer.  In effect, the
producer’s option would be a variation on a right of first refusal.  Upon signing the agreement, the86
artist commits to being available.  The producer can terminate the artist without cost until the start
of shooting or until it “matches” an outside offer that includes a pay-or-play provision.
B.  Past Performance
Not all pay-or-play clauses are meant to balance the talent’s reliance against the studio’s
flexibility.  For some, their contribution to a project is essentially completed by the time the pay-or-
play clause is triggered.  The “packaging producer” (as opposed to the “line producer” who will be
involved during production) will typically have compensation in three pieces.  A producer would
receive a fairly modest (currently in the $25,000-$50,000 range) development fee.  Since most
projects fail to come to fruition, that is all the producer would receive.  If, however, the project
advances to a certain point, the producer will receive the fixed component of the compensation which
might well be ten times (or more) the development fee.  Finally, if the producer continues with the
project until completion, the producer would be eligible for contingent compensation, likely as a share
of “net profits.”   Since the pack ging producer is not expected to be involved in the production of87
the film, a pay-or-play clause is a convenient device for limiting the required compensation to the first
two components.  Once the packaging producer’s contribution is complete, the studio can simply
     The packaging producer’s clause has to be triggered by a particular contractually defined88
event, preferably one that reflects the completion of that phase of the process.  One common
choice is the date at which some principal (the star and/or the director) is made pay-or-play.  
     See text at note 69 above.89
     The studio with the largest box office share has averaged around 20% since 1975.  See90
Encyclopedia of Exhibition, 1996-97 (Published by National Association of Theatre Owners), p.
194.  The adverse effects of another studio’s having a big hit are diffused over the remaining
producers, so that the rewards to thwarting a project will be spread over the remaining studios;
the initial studio would receive only a small share of the returns.
     Judge Kingsley recognized this; Paramount, as he noted, had something akin to a first refusal91
right in Carroll Baker’s contract.  See text at note 69 above.
     Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 92
One View of the Cathedral,” 85 Harvard Law Review 1089 (1972).
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invoke the pay-or-play clause providing the producer with the fixed compensation and relieving itself
of the legal burden to pay the contingent compensation.   The s udio has purchased an option on the88
producer’s time, but, unlike the actor’s contract, the presumption is that the studio will choose not
to exercise the option.
C.  Offset
Judge Kingsley’s characterization of the pay-or-play clause as “assuranc  that a performer will
not, without its consent, create competition for other pictures of the employer” is slightly off on two89
counts.  The primary motivating force is almost certainly not shielding the studio from the actor
creating competition, although industry people might characterize it this way.  It is not plausible that
preventing the production of a film with a particular star in a particular narrow window of time
(fourteen weeks for Shirley MacLaine) would have much of an impact on the individual studio.90
Nor does the actor require the studio’s consent.  The contract grants the studio a limited91
right to prevent the actor from working with another studio (and perhaps other potential employers)
for a specified period.  That right is protected not by a “property rule” but only by a “liability rule.”92
That is, the studio cannot prevent the actor from working with someone else during the production
period; it can only collect damages by setting off payments from the third party against its fixed
compensation liability.
It was not always so. When most artists were under long-term contracts in the 1930's and
1940's, the studio did have the right to prevent them from working elsewhere.  This did not mean that
the artist wouldn’t work elsewhere; it simply meant that the third party employer had to bargain with
the studio to“rent” the employee.  If the artist's  market value were greater than the contract price,
     Thomas Schatz note 73, p. 323.93
     See text at note 69 above.94
     On the value of a track record, see Goldberg note 7 supra,  at 540, and the materials cited95
therein.  Recall that in Locke (supra, note ?) the court explicitly recognized that production of the
film could enhance career prospects.
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the studio could pocket the difference.  Renting talent from other studios was a common
occurrence—an industry study found over 2,000 loan-outs of actors, directors, and cinematographers
among the seven major studios in 1933-1939.  93
So, although the studio in the 1930's had the power to prevent an actor from “creating
competition,” it usually chose not to wield that power.  Rather, it more typically attempted to allocate
its “assets” (artists under contract) to their highest and best use, since the studio would benefit both
from the direct payments on this film and, possibly, the enhanced reputation of the artist.  That might
entail having the artist “sit and wait,” but the motive for refusing to loan out the artist would be94
management of the inventory of talent (a b tter use for that artist might come along), not preventing
the creation of competition.  
1.  One Picture Deals.  In the modern era, the studio’s right has been protected only by a
liability rule, in both one-shot deals (Shirley MacLaine) and in multi-picture deals (Carroll Baker).
I will discuss some aspects of the multi-picture deal below, but for now will focus on the one-shot
deal.  If the studio invokes the pay-or-play clause, the artist is free to contract with someone else in
the time slot.  However, any earnings must be offset against the original contract.  Rather tha
requiring the artist or third-party employer to negotiate with the original studio, the rule fixes a price
in advance.  The rule appears to establish a 100% tax on the subsequent transaction which would
seem to dampen incentives.  Why shouldn’t Shirley MacLaine just go to the beach? 
Even if the entire f xed compensation had to be set off, there are good reasons why an artist
might choose to perform rather than remain idle.  First, the fixed compensation is only one element
in the compensation package.  Shirley MacLaine stood to make millions on her gross participation.
Even if the compensation terms of the second contract were identical, the expected value of the
contract would be substantially greater than her Bloomer Girl fixed compensation.  If opportunities
for roles of equivalent economic value are few and far between, she might find the potential gains
from the contingent compensation attractive despite the fact that the fixed compensation from the
second movie would go to Fox, not her.  Second, if the period between signing the original contract
and the production period is long (over nine months in Shirley MacLaine’s case), the artist's market
value can change dramatically.  If an actor had one box office hit in the interim, fixed compensation
might well jump from $100,000 on the canceled picture to $1 million on the new one.  Third, even
if the expected compensation for the second picture just equaled the pay-or-play obligation (so that
the expected net compensation was zero), the actor might still be willing to make the second picture
because doing so might enhance future earnings.  Fourth, since salaries are paid weekly, the offset95
     I am indebted to Saul Levmore and Kenny Jones for raising this issue in workshops.  It is,96
essentially, the argument for encouraging anticipatory repudiation by a party who has determined
that it will not perform.
     See text at note 59 above.97
     Constance Bennett’s radio performances might be a closer case.  These were, in part, an98
investment in developing a presence in an alternative medium; indeed, in the 1940's she
devoted more attention to radio than to film.  (Rod Crawford <puffinus@u.washington.edu> at
Internet Movie Data Base, http://us.imdb.com.)
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only applies to the overlapping period.  So, for example, had MacLaine started a movie with a
different studio in the last week of the pay-or-play period, only one week of her compensation
($53,571.43) would be offset.
The preceding paragraph presupposes that the initial studio would be willing and able to
enforce the entire offset.  That is unlikely.  The first studio is, in effect, bargaining with the second,
and its bargaining position is not terribly strong.  Its only chip in the negotiations is the few weeks
of the career of a particular artist.  The second studio has two dimensions in which it can substitute.
It could choose someone else to perform, someone not burdened by the offset "tax."  Or it could shift
the timing of the project to avoid the pay-or-play period.  That flexibility should, in most instances,
enable the second studio to bargain away a considerable portion of the offset.  If the artist has the
right to refuse any offer, no matter how reasonable, the duty to offset is not likely to be onerous.  
Still, even though the tax is likely to be much less than 100%, that doesn’t explain why there
should be any tax at all.  Why not simply let the artist take any new offer that comes along
unencumbered by the previous arrangement with the studio?  The most plausible reason is that the
tax (whatever its effective rate) provides some incentive for the studio to terminate in a timely
manner.  The earlier the exercise of the pay-or-play option, the more likely it is that the artist will find
alternative employment and provide some offset to the first studio’s contractual obligation.96
These arguments suggest that Judge Zack err d in stating that all earnings during the pay-or-
play period, even those as a seamstress, ust be offset against the studio’s obligation.  If the artist
knew that such earnings—a small fraction of the studio’s obligation—would be offset, then there is
no reason for the actor to work (the tax is 100%) and no reason for the parties to bargain over it.
The only reasons the artist might engae in such non-theatrical work would be ignorance (she didn’t
know the rule) or an expectation that the studio wouldn’t bother to enforce its legal right.  Tha
expectation is likely to be correct sinc  in most instances it would not be worth the studio’s effort to
litigate the matter, although if a case were litigated on other grounds  studio would likely raise this
point in its attempt to limit damages (as was the case in Constance Bennett’s radio contracts).  S ,97
while application of the offset rule for non-entertainment alternative employment would be silly,it98
is unlikely to cause much harm since the parties would not, in most instances, take it seriously.
     For a description of Betty Davis’s battles with Warner Brothers in the 1930's, see Schatz,99
note 73  at __.
     See text at note 69 above.100
     Cite.  See the redacted "Term Loanout Agreement" on file with author.  Artists typically set101
up their own corporations which then loan out the artist to the movie studio.
     If the artist accepted, then the pay-or-play clause would be triggered; if the artist rejected,102
then there would still be consequences as described below in the text at note ?.
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2.  Multi-Picture Deals.  The modern multi-picture deal differs markedly from the long-term
contracts of yesteryear.  In the pre-1950 long-term contracts, the artist’s ability to reject a proposed
role was drastically curtailed.  The studio assigned the artist to a film and, if the artist refused, the
studio could suspend the artist.  If the artist wanted to make a picture with another studio, she99
needed permission from the first studio.  Now, the studio has the obligation to offer projects, but the
artist need not accept.  Nor would the studio have the exclusive right to the artist’s services.  If the
artist wanted to make a film with another studio, the first studio would have, in essence, a first refusal
right.  Technically, a first refusal right allows the holder to buy an asset (here the artist's time) at a
price fixed by the t ird party.  In this case, the relevant constraint is not the third party's offer price,
but merely the existence of an offer which the artist finds acceptable.  As Judge Kingsley noted in a
footnote in his discussion of the Carroll Baker contract, “under the contract, plaintiff could perform
for another producer, provided she gave Paramount notice of her intent; in that event, Paramount was
required either to consent or to schedule her for its own picture at the time or times involved.”  If100
the studio fails to offer a role for the time slot, the artist is free to make the film elsewhere.  If the
artist were the originator of the project, she might have to offer the contract studio a "first look."  If
the studio fails to pick up the roj ct within a contractually determined time period, the artist would
be free to shop it elsewhere.
  Carroll Baker’s contract made her pay-or-play for at least one film each year.  An alternative,
and I think more common, arrangement, would give the studio an option to use the artist in one101
film each year for one fee (a guarantee).  If the studio desired to use the artist in a particular film, it
would offer the artist pay-or-play status for a second fee (at a predetermined rate).  Regardless of102
the precise structure, there remains the same two problems.  First, if the studio cannot require the
artist to work on a particular film, what consequences might the artist bear by refusing a project?
Second, if , say, Fox offers a part to Carroll Baker and Paramou t fails to match, should Paramount’s
"guarantee payment” (the $200,000) be offset y the earnings from the second studio’s project?  Or,
turning that around, should Fox have to repay some or all of Paramount’s guarantee payment as a
cost of hiring Carroll Baker?
 The artist’s discretion is a crucial variable in a multi-picture deal and the outcome will reflect
the bargaining power (marketability) of the artist.  The more powerful artists will demand
considerable freedom in their choice of roles, while relative unknowns would have much less
     The arrangement described in this paragraph is essentially the one established in the redacted103
contract referred to in note 99 above.
     In a related context, the offset issue was at the core of a dispute between John Calipari and104
the New Jersey Nets.  Calipari entered into a five-year contract to coach the Nets.  He had been
coaching for a few months before the deal had been memorialized in a writing (heaven knows
why).  At that stage Calipari insisted that there be no offset if he were fired and subsequently hired
as a basketball coach during the duration of the contract.  Calipari ultimately prevailed. 
Contemporaneous press accounts suggested that the majority of National Basketball Association
coach’s (seventeen) were required to offset their earnings from the second coaching job against
the unpaid balance of the first contract.  More powerful coaches (Pat Riley and Larry Brown were
named) did not have offset clauses.  See Selena Roberts, "Calipari Resisting A Contract
Addition,"  The New York Times,  Section B; Page 15,  November 20, 1996; and Will
McDonough, "Calipari agrees to stay with Nets," The Boston Globe, Pg. D5, November 21,
1996.
The offset issue arises in guaranteed player contracts as well.  Arbitrations in both the
National Basketball Association and National Football League held that where the contract was
silent, guaranteed player contracts did not require the player to offset when signing with another
team.  See National Football League Players' Association v. National Football League
Management Council, 188 Cal. App. 3d 192; 233 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1986) (Arbitration of Dante
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discretion.  The pay-or-play clause can be used to make the artist take the studio's reliance interest
seriously, a reversal of the single-picture story.  If the studio offers the artist a role and evidences103
its seriousness by offering to make the artist pay-or-play, and the rtist refuses, the artist can be made
to bear the costs in two dimensions.  The contract could require that the fixed compensation which
would have been triggered by the pay-or-play clause be offset against the guarantee.  That would
mean that the studio has met its obligation of employing the artist for one of the contracted pictures,
but at a relatively modest cost.  Addi ionally, the pay-or-play offer could define a time period during
which the artist could not perform for another studio without the studio's consent (or at least a right
of offset).  By varying (a) the ease with which the studio can trigger the pay-or-play clause and (b)
the artist’s ability to accept offers from other studios (the length of time, the reasonableness of
consent, the magnitude of the offset), the parties can customize to some degree the cost to the artist
of rejecting the studio’s proposed role.
With the multi-picture deal, the breadth of the studio's option is much greater than the one-
shot deal.  In the one-shot deal, the artist had committed to a tightly defined time period.  The
narrowness of that window constrained the first studio’s bargaining power; the second studio could
wait a few weeks (at a cost) and eliminate the problem.  That is not so for the multi-picture deal as
a whole (although it is true fo each individual project offered to the artist).  I would suspect that an
artist with considerable bargaining power when entering i to a long-term contract (i. e., one that was
very marketable) would eliminate the offset.  That would allow pursuit of outside offers without
penalty and would also enhance the employr’s incentive to find attractive roles.  The less successful
(at the time of contract formation) are more likely to be stuck with a duty to offset.104
Pastorini & Oakland Raiders) and Arbitration of Rudy Hackett & Denver Nuggets (1977). The
NBA collective bargaining agreement was subsequently revised to provide for offset against
guaranteed compensation; see Paul Weiler, ___ at 299.
     De la Falaise could be justified if the court had recognized a distinction between cases in105
which the plaintiff had been employed (offset) and those in which (like Parker) it had not.  The
court could plausibly argue that a radio play, unlike a seamstress job, is close enough (not
inferior) to warrant an offset of the earnings, if earnings there be, while still holding that the law
did not require that the plaintiff accept a radio script in mitigation.
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IV. Concluding Remarks
Whether the parties would require offset in a particular contract, one-shot or multi-picture,
is a hard question.  It should not, however, be confused with the much easier question raised by
Parker:  Must the artist take a reasonable offer to “mitigate” damages?  No. Shirley MacLaine
granted the studio an option to utilize her services for a specific use and a specific purpose.  For good
and sensible reasons, the studio was prepared to pay a considerable sum for that option. It then chose
not to exercise the option.  The studio's breach was not the failure to make the film, but only the
failure to pay the contracted for option price.  Had the courts framed the question properly, they
would have reached the right result for the right reasons.  
Instead, the court took a "different and inferior" path (in both senses).  The court asked
whether the alternate employment was different and inferior as a matter of law and somehow
concluded that it was.  It is hard to imagine how a rational court could find the second contract
"different and inferior" as a matter of law while at the same time citing with approval  de la Fal ise.
After all, that court found radio plays (regardless of content) dif erent but not inferior.  If a radio play
is not inferior to a movie, how could a court find one unmade movie necessarily inferior to another?105
 The fact that there were significant differences between Bloomer Girl and Big Country, Big
Man,  I suspect, encouraged th  courts to go down the wrong track.  Suppose that the second offer
was virtually identical—a Hollywood musical with the same director, same approvals, same
compensation, same timing, and same politics.  Had she refused to make the second picture as
"mitigation", then she could not have raised the "different and inferior" objection.  Without the
"different and inferior" crutch, the parties would have pose  the pr blem properly, and the court, like
Judge Kingsley in Garfein, would have disposed of it neatly.
Maybe.  A les sanguine view would be that the P rker analysis is symptomatic of deeper
problems.  Why did the California Supreme Court ignore the purpose of the relevant contract
language in determining whether Shirley MacLaine had to mitigate?  Does the disjunction between
contract law's analytic boxes and transactional lawyer's practical concerns lead to systematic error in
     Part of the problem, I suspect, is the notion held by many contracts professors that $750,000106
(in 1965 dollars) is too much to pay Shirley MacLaine for “doing nothing.”  One wonders how
they will cope with Sondra Locke’s claim that $1,500,000 for “doing nothing” is too little.  Of
course, as Judge Kingsley pointed out in Garfe , they are not “doing nothing;” they also serve
who only sit and wait.
     Frug, note 7, at ___.  The socio-political context receives at least lip service in a few107
casebooks; see Macaulay and Whitford, note 1 supra, at 63-65; Farnsworth and Young, note 1
supra,  at 513; Knapp and Crystal, note 1 supra,  at ___, and Kastely, et al, note 1 supra, at 1024.
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contract litigation?  In particular, is there a hostility against option arrangements, which could be
viewed as a form of "penalty clause?"  (The studio agrees, in effect, to pay a penalty if it fails to
perform.) Indeed, when I presented an earlier draft of this paper at workshops, the immediate
response was to ask if contracting parties could use the option characterization to evade the penalty
clause bar.   To which the appropriate response should be: Hear, hear.  There is no reason for106
wooden application of the rule barring penalty clauses.  Shirley MacLaine is no Shylock.  The studios
are not being put upon by her or other artists; they include pay-or-play clauses in their contracts (and
these are, after all, the studios’ contracts) for good reason.  The pay-or-play clause is a nuanced
balancing of the studio's need for flexibility against the artist's reliance.
Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of Parker is that the court's framing of the issue has
seemed so appropriate and non-controversial to legal scholars and courts for over a quarter of a
century.  The court might have drawn the "different and inferior" boundary in the wrong place, but
there has been no questioning the notion that ascertaining this boundary is the relevant inquiry.  Even
the one attempt to reframe P rk r, Mary Jo Frug's feminist discussion, stays within the "different and
inferior" framework.  Contracts casebooks, in general, and Dawson, Harvey, and Henderson, in
particular, she claimed,
 
. . . inexplicably . . . omit material that would confirm readers’ intuitions that the
social context and political significance of the films might explain the application of
the “different and inferior” qualification in Parker.  Dawson, Harvey, and Henderson
thus subtly deter readers who are familiar with nineteenth century feminist activists
and their work from utilizing their personal connections with the case to understand
Parker. . . .  Although reader’s intuitions about the  Parker case may in fact explain
the otherwise baffling result of this decision, the casebook does not encourage them
to draw on these intuitions.107
It makes no sense to interpret a standardized clause on the basis of the hypothesized idiosyncratic
politics of a particular artist.  The court, unfortunately, invited argument along these (and other
irrelevant) lines and academics, alas, have accepted.
